A model-to-model transformation from Dynamic Fault Trees to Stochastic Petri Nets, by means of graph transformation rules, is presented in this paper. Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) are used for the reliability analysis of complex and large systems and represent by means of gates, how combinations or sequences of component failure events, lead to the failure of the system. DFTs need the state space solution which can be obtained by converting a DFT to a Stochastic Petri Net: this task is expressed by means of graph transformation rules, and is applied to a case of system.
Introduction
One of the measure to quantify the dependability of safety or mission critical systems, is the reliability (R(t)) [9] . The reliability of a system as a function of the time t, is the probability that the system performs the required function in the interval (0, t). The unreliability of the system (U(t)) instead, is the probability that the system is failed at time t, equal to 1 − R(t). The construction of models, is the typical way to evaluate the (un)reliability or other dependability measures.
DFT definition
Despite its name, a DFT is a bipartite directed acyclic graph (DAG), even if it appears very similar to a tree graph from a graphical point of view; an example of DFT is reported in Fig. 3 . The nodes can be failure events or gates: failure events are indicated by rectangles and are equivalent to boolean variables whose value is initially false and turns to true when the failure event occurs; gates are connected to events by means of arcs and have several input events and a unique output event, connected respectively below and above the gate.
The DFT arcs always respect a circuit logic orientation: from input events to the gate, and from the gate to the its output event. For this reason, their orientation is not graphically shown.
The events indicated by rectangles with a circle, are called basic events and correspond to the failure events of the physical components of the system; the occurrence time of such events is a random variable ruled by a probability distribution, typically a negative exponential distribution whose parameter λ is the component failure rate.
The internal events, indicated by white rectangles, model the failures of subsystems and are the output of a gate. An internal event occurs when a particular combination of the input events of the gate, occurs: the type of combination is determined by the type of gate.
While basic events can not be the output of any gate, there is a unique event called top event (indicated by a black rectangle) that can only be the output of gates; the top event represents the failure of the whole system.
A DFT differs from a tree graph by the fact that an event node may belong to several subtrees, i. e. an event may be the input of several gates.
A DFT can contain both boolean and dynamic gates. Boolean gates were introduced in standard FTs, and model boolean conditions; they are:
• AND ( Fig. 1.a) : given a set of n (n ≥ 2) input events X 1 , . . . X n and an output event Y , Y is failed (true) if every input event is failed (true).
• OR ( Fig. 1.b ): given a set of n (n ≥ 2) input events X 1 . . . X n and an output event Y , Y is failed if at least one input event is failed.
• k OUT OF n ( Fig. 1 .c): given a set of n (n ≥ 3) input events X 1 . . . X n and an output event Y , Y is failed if at least k (1 < k < n) input events are failed (k must be specified).
Dynamic gates [5] were introduced in the DFT formalism, and model functional or temporal dependencies among failure events or component states; dynamic gate are:
• Functional Dependency Gate (FDEP) ( Fig. 1.d) : given a trigger event T , a set of m (m ≥ 1) dependent input events D 1 . . . D m , and an output event Y , D 1 . . . D m are forced to fail when T fails; Y fails when T fails.
• Priority And (PAND) ( Fig. 1.e ): given a set of n (n ≥ 2) input events X 1 . . . X n and an output event Y , Y gets failed if every input event is failed, and X 1 . . . X n failed in a specific temporal order (graphically, from left to right).
• Sequence Enforcing Gate (SEQ) ( Fig. 1 .f): given a set of n (n ≥ 2) input events X 1 . . . X n and an output event Y , X 1 . . . X n are forced to fail in a specific order (graphically, from left to right); Y fails when X n fails. In this paper, we assume that this gate can have only basic input events.
• Warm Spare Gate (WSP) ( Fig. 1 with respect to its current state: if in the working state its failure rate is λ, while it is dormant its failure rate is αλ, where α is the dormancy factor (0 < α < 1). If Y is the output of this gate, Y fails when both M and S are failed. In this paper, we assume that a main component can be replaced by only one spare, and S can not be the input of another gate. Moreover, we graphically represent the basic event relative to a spare, using a bold symbol ( Fig. 1 .g), in order to be distinguished from the other basic events. 
The case of the multiprocessor system
Let us consider the case of a multiprocessor computing system; its scheme is shown in Fig. 2 . The system is composed by three computing devices (C1, C2, C3), two hard disks (primary and backup), and one bus connecting all the components together; every computing device is composed by one processor and one memory. The disks are shared among the computing devices: they store their data on the primary disk, while the task of updating periodically the backup (spare) disk, is assigned to the device C3. The data stored on the backup disk, is not accessed while the primary disk is not failed; during this period, the backup disk is used only for the update operations, so we can imagine that its failure rate is less than the failure rate of the primary disk.
If the primary disk fails, it is replaced by the backup disk; from this moment, the computing devices access the backup disk to read or write data, so the failure rate of the backup disk becomes equal to the failure rate of the primary one. 3.1 DFT model of the system failure Fig. 3 shows the DFT for this system, modelling all the possible ways leading to the system failure. The "root" of the DFT is T E representing the whole system failure; T E is the output of an OR gate, so it happens if at least one of these events, occurs: COMP , BUS, UP DAT E, DAT A. The event COMP represents the failure of all the computing devices; COMP is the output of an AND gate whose input events are C1, C2, C3; each of them corresponds to the failure of a computing device. In the case of C1, its failure occurs if its processor or its memory fails, so the event C1 is the output of an OR gate connected to the basic events P ROC1 and MEM1, modelling the failure of such basic components. The subtrees below C2 and C3 have the same structure of the subtree below C1.
The basic event BUS is another direct cause of T E; if the bus fails, the connection among the components is not possible avoiding the system to work. The system fails also if the event UP DAT E occurs; such event means that the the backup disk update has not been perfomed recently. The event UP DAT E is the output of a PAND gate whose input events are C3 and P RIMARY , so UP DAT E occurs if both C3 and P RIMARY have occurred, and C3 occurred before P RIMARY . This means that at the moment of the failure of the primary disk and the consequent replacement by the backup disk, this one is not correctly updated, because C3 failed before the primary disk, and did not update recently the backup disk.
The whole system fails also if the data are not available on any disk; this is represented by the event DAT A that is the output of a WSP gate whose input events are P RIMARY and BACKUP modelling the failure of the primary and backup disk respectively. The WSP gate models the fact that the backup disk is the spare of the primary one, with the consequent reduction of the failure rate of the backup disk while it is not accessed for the reading or writing data (dormant state). Such converter implements in an ad-hoc way the model-to-model transformation described in this paper; its input is the XML representation of the DFT, while its output is the equivalent GSPN expressed in the formalism used by GreatSPN (text file).
The GSPN returned by the converter, is passed to the GSPN solver of GreatSPN performing its state space analysis and returning the probability at time t of the system failure state. Such measure is the unreliability of the system, and is graphically displayed by DrawNET.
Some notions on GSPNs
This section describes some of the elements of the GSPN formalism, used in the transformation rules described in section 6. More information on GSPNs can be found in [1] .
GSPN composing elements are places, immediate transitions, timed transitions, oriented arcs and inhibitor arcs. Places (graphically represented by circles) can contain tokens, while transitions are enabled to fire when a certain net marking (number of tokens inside each place) holds. Immediate transitions (black rectangles, not to be confused with the DFT top event) fire as soon as they are enabled, while timed transitions (white rectangles, not to be confused with DFT internal events) fire after a random period of time which is a random variable ruled by a negative exponential distribution whose parameter is the firing rate of the transition.
Oriented arcs are used to move tokens when a transition fires, while inhibitor arcs can connect a place to a transition in order to disable the transition firing if the place is not empty. Inhibitor arcs end with a small circle. A cardinality can be assigned to an arc in order to set the number of tokens to be moved, or necessary to disable the firing of a transition.
The first step of the analysis of a GSPN, consists of generating the reachability graph, i. e. all the possible GSPN markings due to transition firings. From the reachability graph, the corresponding CTMC can be obtained and analyzed.
The conversion from DFT to GSPN
This section provides a set of transformation rules allowing the conversion of DFTs in GSPNs.
The starting graph is a DFT and at each step of the conversion process, a transformation rule is applied with the effect of replacing a DFT node with the equivalent GSPN elements. So, during the conversion steps, the graph has an hybrid form, containing both DFT and GSPN elements. At the end of the conversion process, when every DFT node has been replaced, we obtain a "pure" GSPN semantically equivalent to the initial DFT.
The transformation rules are in the form r = (L, K, R) [6] , where L is the left hand side of the rule, K is the interface graph (a common subgraph of L and R), R is the right hand side of the rule.
Assuming that the current source graph is G, the application of a rule follows these steps: 1. find an occurrence of L in G;
2. if found, remove L − K from G, obtaining the graph D; 3. glue R in D via K, obtaining the target graph H.
There is a correspondence between the DFT and the GSPN elements: -generic event ⇔ place -not occurred event ⇔ empty place -occurred event ⇔ marked place -basic event occurrence ⇔ timed transition firing -gate ⇔ set of immediate transitions Such equivalences are exploited in the transformation rules.
In DFTs, the number of gates an event can be input of, is at least one, whereas a minimum number of input events is defined for each type of gate; at the same time, such quantities have no upper limit. For this reason, in our transformation rules, some nodes or arcs may be dashed; this means that such elements can be present in the graph for a number of times whose minimum is zero. For instance, in the rule in Fig. 5 .a relative to a basic event, two generic gates are present: one of them is drawn using a solid line meaning that a basic event is surely the input of one gate, the other one is dashed meaning that a basic event may be also the input of more gates. In general, the transformation of an occurrence of dashed nodes or arcs in the left hand side of a rule, is still indicated by dashed elements in the right hand side.
Actually, the presence of dashed parts in a rule, is equivalent to have an infinite number of rules for the same DFT node; for instance, in the case of the basic event ( Fig. 5.a) , we would have a rule for each possible number of gates the basic event may be input of. Such inconvenient could be avoided by fixing an upper limit for such quantity, or by formulating the rules in recursive form. However, we chose the form with dashed parts, because it allows the reader to see directly in the right hand side of the rule, the complete subnet corresponding to the DFT node present in the left hand side. This is useful to show the semantic equivalence between a DFT node and its conversion to GSPN elements. Fig. 5 .a shows the transformation rule for a basic event. Such event is the failure of a component of the system, and occurs after a random period of time. So, a basic event BE, input of any number of gates (left hand side of the rule in Fig. 5.a) , is converted in the timed transition BE fail modelling the component failure occurrence, and in the place BE dn (dn is the abbreviation of "down", i. e. failed) modelling the state of the component (right hand side of the rule in Fig. 5.a) . The firing rate of the transition BE fail is the failure rate of the component (λ BE ); when such transition fires, it puts one token inside the place BE dn; this means that the failure of the component has occurred. The firing of BE fail is not repeatable. The place BE dn is connected to the same gate(s), the event BE was input of.
Events transformation
If we have a basic event connected to a WSP gate to represent the presence of a spare component, we have not to apply the rule in Fig. 5 .a, but the rule in Fig. 5 .b. If S is such a basic event, it must be converted in a subnet modelling both the failure in the dormant and in the working state. Such subnet is composed by three places (S OF F , S ON, S dn) modelling the states of a spare, and two timed transitions (S OF F fail, S ON fail) modelling the failure occurrence with respect to the current state: the transition S OF F fail is enabled if S OF F is marked (the spare is dormant), while S ON fail is enabled if S ON is marked (the spare is working); the effect of the firing of both transitions is the marking of the place S dn (the spare is failed). S OF F is initially marked because the spare is initially dormant. If λ S is the failure rate, and α S is the dormancy factor of the spare, the firing rate of S OF F fail is α S λ S , while the firing rate of S ON fail is λ S .
An internal event E is always the output of one gate, and the input of one or more gates (left hand side of the rule in Fig. 5.c) . So, E is converted in the place E dn connected to the same gates (right hand side of the rule in Fig.  5 .c). Also in the rule in Fig. 5 .c, we have a dashed gate to cope with the fact that an internal event is the input of at least one gate.
The top event T E can only be the output of a gate, so it is converted in the place T E dn connected to the same gate ( Fig. 5.d) .
AND gate transformation
The AND gate ( Fig. 6 .a) is transformed to a single immediate transition. Each of the places corresponding to the gate input events (X1 dn, X2 dn, . . .), is connected to the immediate transition by a couple of oriented arc. So, such transition fires when X1 dn, X2 dn, . . . are all marked; in other words, it fires when all the input events have occurred; as effect of the firing, one token appears in the place corresponding to the output event of the gate (Y dn). The token inside the places X1 dn, X2 dn, . . ., is not removed because in the DFT, an event may be the input of several gates, so in the GSPN, the corresponding place may enable several transitions if it is marked.
In the rule in Fig. 6 .a, three places are present: one of them is dashed to indicate that an AND gate may have more than two input events.
OR gate transformation
The OR gate is transformed to a set of immediate transitions (Fig. 6.b is created; the transition or1 for instance, puts a token inside the place corresponding to the output of the gate (Y dn), as soon as X1 dn becomes marked. So, a token appears in Y dn as soon as one of the places X1 dn, X2 dn, . . ., becomes marked, in other words, when one of the input events occurs.
k OUT OF n gate transformation
This gate is replaced by a net (Fig. 6.c) with the purpose of counting the number of occurred input events. A transition is created for each place corresponding to the gate input events (X1 dn, X2 dn, . . .); such transition fires when the relative place becomes marked and puts one token inside the place Y count. The aim of such place is counting the number of occurred input events. When Y count contains k tokens (k is the parameter of the gate), a specific immediate transition called k out of n, puts one token inside Y dn which corresponds to the output event of the gate.
FDEP gate transformation
For the place corresponding to the output event of a FDEP gate (Y dn), and for each place corresponding to a dependent event (D1 dn, . . .), an immediate transition is created. Such transitions fire as soon as the place T dn (modelling the occurrence of the trigger event) becomes marked, with the effect of putting one token inside Y dn, D1 dn, . . ., unless these places are already marked (the dependent events may have already occurred for another cause).
PAND gate transformation
The net replacing this gate ( Fig. 7 .b) must verify that the specified order of the input events is respected: for every couple of adjacent places corresponding to the gate input events, an immediate transition is created. If we consider X1 dn and X2 dn, the transition pand2 fires if X2 dn becomes marked and X1 dn is empty, in other words if the event X2 occurs before X1. One token appears in the place Y ok after the firing of pand2, meaning that the specified order has not been respected. In general, when an input event occurs, we verify if its predecessor in the specified failure order, has already occurred or not. When all X1 dn, X2 dn, . . . are marked, only if the place Y ok is not marked, one token appears in the place Y dn, by means of the immediate transition pand1.
SEQ gate transformation
We assume that this gate can be connected only to basic events, so after the application of the transformation rule for the basic events ( Fig. 5.a) , the SEQ gate is connected to several subnets (left hand side of Fig. 7 .c); each of them is composed by a place and a timed transition, corresponding to a basic event. This gate forces the input events to occur in a specified order, so the effect of the relative transformation rule is the addition of a couple of oriented arcs connecting the timed transition relative to a basic event, with the place relative to the previous basic event in the order. If we consider the timed transition X2 fail, it can fires only after the appearence of one token in the place X1 dn. In this way, the event X2 can occur only after X1. The place Y dn corresponding to the output event of the gate, becomes marked by means of the immediate transition seq, when the last basic event occurs.
WSP gate transformation
The transformation rule for the WSP gate is shown in Fig. 7.d ; in the left hand side of the rule, the failure of the spare in both the dormant and the working state, is already modelled by the effect of the application of the rule in Fig. 5.b . The gate is replaced in the right hand side of Fig. 7 .d, by two immediate transitions: wsp1 and wsp2; the aim of the first one is turning the spare from dormant to working when the place M dn becomes marked (the main component fails); this is possible only if S OF F is marked (the spare is dormant, not already failed). If this transition can fire, it moves the token from S OF F to S ON, enabling the firing of the timed transition S ON fail, previously created. The place Y dn gets marked by means of the transition wsp2, when both M dn and S dn are marked.
Discussion on the transformation correctness
So far, we discussed for each transformation rule, the semantic equivalence between the DFT element on the left hand side of the rule, and the subnet replacing such element in the right hand side. This section provides some considerations about the correctness of the whole conversion process.
Initially the graph is a DFT; the only transformation rules we can apply on it, are relative to the conversion of the events. The conversion of an event (basic, internal or top event) is not influenced by the type of gate the event is connected to (as input or output), except in the case of a basic event which is relative to a spare component and is the second input of a WSP gate. For this case, a specific rule has been defined ( Fig. 5.b) .
The transformation rule for the conversion of any kind of gate, is enabled as soon as all the input events, and the output event of the gate, have been converted in places.
Several rules may be enabled at the same time: the order of application is not relevant to the effect of the transformation. In other words, the result of the conversion process is unique: the left hand side of each rule is not included in the left hand side of any other rule. So, for each subgraph composed by a DFT node and all the elements connected to it, there is only one transformation rule matching such subgraph. Moreover, the effect of a rule is the removal of a single DFT node and its substitution with the semantically equivalent subnet which will not be modified by the application of other transformation rules.
Each rule is applied a number of times equal to the number of precences of the relative DFT node in the initial graph. Since a DFT is composed by a finite number of nodes, the conversion process will end after a finite number of transformation steps, equal to the number of nodes in the initial DFT. Fig. 8 shows the GSPN obtained by applying our transformation rules on the DFT in Fig. 3 . The unreliability of the system at time t, is equal to the probability of the presence at time t of one token inside the place T E dn, equivalent to the top event T E in the DFT; such measure can be computed by the GSPN solver. Fig. 9 shows the unreliability of the multiprocessor computing system as a function of the time varying from 0 to 5000 hours. In a similar way, we can compute the unreliability of a single component or subsystem; for instance, the unreliability at time t of the subsystem composed by the computing devices, is the probability that the place COMP dn contains one token at time t.
Unreliability evaluation on the GSPN

Further work on DFTs
In this paper, the model-to-model conversion from DFTs to GSPNs is realized by means of graph transformation rules; the work is motivated by two reasons: the state space solution of DFTs, and the implementation of a tool for DFTs analysis exploiting the GSPN solver. However, the state space analysis may be computationally expensive since the number of states grows exponentially with respect to the number of components. For this reason, a modular approach is preferable; it consists on the use of both the combinatorial and the state space solution: instead of analyzing the whole DFT in the state space, independent subtrees (modules) are analyzed in isolation. If a module contains one or more dynamic gates the state space solution is used, else the less expensive combinatorial solution. In this way, the state space size is reduced.
Another way to reduce the state space size, consists on modelling the redundancies or the symmetries in the system, using the parametric form: in the Dynamic Parametric Fault Tree (DPFT) [2] formalism, subtrees with the same structure can be folded into a unique parametric subtree. DPFT dynamic modules can be converted in Stochastic Well-formed colored Nets (SWN) [3] , instead of GSPNs. From a SWN, a symbolic state space can be generated instead of the ordinary one, with a reduction of the state space size and consequently of the computational costs; such reduction is proportional to the degree of symmetry or redundancy in the DPFT model. Our tool has been extended in order to analyze DPFTs using both the modular approach and the conversion of dynamic modules in SWNs [2] . 
